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Abstract—Markets arise as an efﬁcient way of organising
resources in Cloud Computing scenarios. In Cloud Comput-
ing Markets, Brokers that represent both Clients and Service
Providers meet in a Market and negotiate for the sales of
resources or services. This paper defends the idea that efﬁcient
negotiations require of the usage of resource-level information
for increasing the accuracy of negotiated Service Level Agree-
ments and facilitating the achievement of both performance and
business goals. A negotiation model based on the maximisation
of nonadditive utility functions that considers multiple objectives
is deﬁned, and its validity is demonstrated in the experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, the big mainframes paradigm where
users own their computing resources is being progressively
transiting to a more utility-driven paradigm, where users do
not own their resources and pay for the usage of remote
resources [1]. Cloud Computing [2] is the most promising
current implementation of Utility Computing in the businesses.
With this new evolution, the classic Resource Management
mechanisms became inefficient because some reasons such as
the heterogeneity and dispersion of resources.
Market-based resource management [3] is proposed as a
paradigm to deal with the complexity because the possibility
of doing business will motivate Service Providers to offer
their resources in the system and give a Quality of Service
(QoS) according to their real capacity. In addition, Market
mechanisms obligate the users to adjust their reservations
of the system to their real space and time requirements.
Another advantage is that it is relatively easy to implement
in a decentralised architecture, where participants enter in the
Market looking for the satisfaction of their own necessities,
and they do not need to know about the global status of the
system to maximise their utility.
In Market-based Cloud computing, either client applications
or end users that want to use remote resources or services,
and providers that want to sell their services, contact with
economic agents (called Brokers) which will negotiate with
other Brokers to buy/sell the services in a Market. When
the Client Brokers find their requirements in the Market, a
negotiation process is started to establish the terms of the
contract. If both parts reach an agreement, the terms of the
contract are specified in a Service Level Agreement (SLA)
and the Client’s application can use the resource. During the
usage of the resources, the correct fulfilment of the terms of the
SLA is watched by a neutral entity, and penalises the buyers
or the sellers if they violate the SLA.
Since Brokers that negotiate for the sales of services are
autonomous, it is needed to provide them with some business
models and intelligent behaviour so they are able to take the
best decisions for Client applications or Service Providers, and
maximise their utility. Current proposals on utility function
models for Market-based Utility Computing negotiations [4],
[5], [6] are additive: they assume that all the factors of the
negotiation are independent from the others. This paper de-
fends the idea that in real negotiations, not all the terms under
negotiation are independent from each others, and proposes
the usage of non-additive utility functions, where the terms
can be interdependent (see section III-B).
This paper enhances existing business models for nego-
tiation and applies them to the sales of services between
computing agents: when a Provider Broker negotiates an SLA
with a Client Broker, it takes into account some economic
terms such as price, but also technical parameters such as
Quality Of Service (QoS) that have influence in the economic
terms: for a purely-economical Provider Broker, it is very
difficult to quantify the SLOs, since it has not enough technical
knowledge about the status and punctual capacities of the re-
sources. The components described in this paper use resource
information in negotiation time to, for example determine if
a task can be executed or not, or the minimum price to make
this task profitable for the Provider. According to this, the
main contributions of this work are:
1) Modelling and characterisation of the negotiations re-
quired to perform sophisticated sales in Market-Based
Cloud Computing in function of the desirable objectives,
by using nonadditive utility functions.
2) Evaluation of the proposed business models for the ne-
gotiation between Brokers. This includes the comparison
of several values for the parameters of the model and
the evaluation about its feasibility and influence in the
achievement of desired objectives.
3) Usage of low-level dynamic knowledge, provided by the
resource fabrics, for supporting economic negotiations.
The required knowledge is defined by the contributions
enumerated in point 1 and 2, and is acquired by the
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resource fabrics monitor in real time.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section
III describes the models used for the negotiation; Section IV
describes the evaluation environment and the results of the
simulation; finally, Section V shows the conclusions of this
work and points to some future research lines.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper is based in the work performed within the
SORMA European project [7], concretely in the Economically
Enhanced Resource Manager (EERM) [8], [9] component.
EERM combines the purely economic knowledge (because
is in direct contact with the economic layers of SORMA
Marketplace) and the plain resources data (because it manages
directly the resource fabrics) to help Brokers to perform better
negotiations and enforce the resource management, not only
having into account performance but also economic goals.
Raiffa [6] established and compiled the mathematical basis
of the negotiation models. He classified the different negotia-
tion models in base to the characteristics of the environment
and the negotiated goods. It will be widely referenced in this
paper, as in the most of the other works about negotiation.
Faratin et al. [5] applied and extended some existing models
for service-oriented decision functions in bilateral negotiations
between autonomous agents. It concentrates in many-parties,
many-issues, single-encounter negotiations with an environ-
ment of limited resources. Since computing services are qual-
itative in nature rather than quantitative, Faratin extends this
model by adding qualitative values and associates fuzzy sets to
them in order to express better the quality in the negotiations.
Once the agents have determined the set of variables over
which they will negotiate, the negotiation process between
two agents consists of an alternate succession of offers and
counteroffers of values for the x, until an offer or counteroffer
is accepted or rejected by the other side or one of the parties
terminates the negotiation. Faratin et al. demonstrated what
this paper affirms: negotiation tactics must be responsive to
changes in the environment.
The work in this paper tries to extend the model of Faratin
by extending the information extracted from the resources
and used in the negotiation, and by having into account
other economic factors, such as reputation, risk management,
etc. Another difference is that Faratin’s work is limited to a
particular scenario: Client and Provider Brokers meet in an
isolated way to negotiate for a single type of resource. This
paper extends this scenario to consider a Market place where
the Brokers negotiate for a huge range of services.
Venugopal et al. [10] introduces a bilateral negotiation
protocol similar to the exposed in this paper, based in the
Alternate Offers mechanism. The main difference is that the
offers/counteroffers cycle of this paper is predefined finite, and
in the Alternate Offers it can continue indefinitely until one of
the parts decides to stop the negotiation. This paper discarded
this possibility mainly by efficiency questions.
III. CHARACTERISATION OF THE NEGOTIATION
A. Negotiation protocol
Before the negotiation starts, the EERM of the Service
Provider must register its offered services into the Market, by
providing some semantic information that allows identifying
what service is and its functionalities, and an extra meta-SLA
with some data about the SLOs that the Service Provider is
willing to negotiate.
When a Client Broker wants to acquire a service, it queries
the Market by providing some semantic information, and gets
a list of the Service Providers that match the requirements
(every Provider has its own EERM) and the meta-data about
the negotiable SLA terms. After that, it selects the suitable
Providers, and creates a proposal of agreement for each one;
using the meta-data it creates an uncompleted SLA with its
requirements, and leaves other SLOs blank. When the EERM
receives the SLA proposal, it evaluates if the proposed terms
can be accepted. If the Client Broker received from the EERM
an acceptance message or a counteroffer, it evaluates it and
finishes the negotiation by rejecting the SLA or by sending a
confirmation message to the EERM.
This work was performed within the SORMA project,
which provides interfaces and protocols for the registration
in the market and the negotiation of resources. However, our
proposal does not rely on any particular interface specification,
since the work is focused exclusively on the negotiation mod-
els and resource management. Although the model has been
designed to work within a Market framework, it is applicable
to the most of current commercial Cloud providers, even if
they do not implement market support. It is only necessary
to have some providers that want to sell their resources
freely on the Internet. In this scenario, the client brokers
only have to know the endpoint where the brokers of the
providers are, to start a negotiation without any intervention
of a market. The nonexistence of a market would decrease the
economic efficiency of the system, because the competence,
the discovery and the reputation mechanisms would be limited.
B. On the usage of non-additive utility functions
First, we must define the analytic model for representing the
negotiations that will be performed by the EERM. This model
must take into account the negotiated SLOs and other terms,
such as Client classification or reservation slots plus the sale
price.
Usual negotiation models for Utility computing are based
in the models proposed by Raiffa [6] and Faratin [5]. This
model is pretty easy to manage and calculate the maximum
and minimum utilities. However, it is an additive model which
assumes that all the factors are independent from the others.
Let S be the SLA under negotiation, Equation 1 shows the
general form of the nonadditive utility function U used in this
paper from the Service Provider side.
U(S) =
m∑
i=1
oiui(S) (1)
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Where m is the number of goals for the Provider, such as
revenue maximisation, reputation, performance maximisation,
high occupation of resources, or satisfaction of certain type
of users. ui is the sub-utility function that defines how much
will be the objective i satisfied, and oi is a number between 0
and 1 that defines the priority that the Provider assigns to the
particular objective. It must be considered that ∑mi=1 oi = 1.
Although Equation 1 is similar to an additive function,
actually it is not. Instead of calculating each of the sub-
utility functions as a function of a single SLA term and finally
add them up, Equation 1 calculates all the sub-utilities as a
function of the whole SLA, because the different objectives
are not independent from the others and, for example, revenue
maximisation can affect negatively the Client satisfaction.
C. Negotiation terms and Utility functions
In this section, we define the set O of objectives, the set S
of SLA terms and the utility function U(S) that calculates
how beneficial the proposed SLA is for the objectives of
the Provider. Prior to this, some representative objectives for
typical Service Providers must be chosen. In this paper, four
objectives have been chosen: O ⊆ {orv, occ, oph, orp}.
• orv is the objective that defines the maximisation of the
revenue. The most common motivation of most of the
Providers that enter in the Market is to earn money by
selling its resources. So the higher is the global revenue,
the higher is urv .
• occ is an objective used for Client classification [11]. This
gives preference to the local users (or users from a near
organisation) over the non-related users.
• oph is the objective that gives preference to tasks or
services to be executed in off-peak hours, to prevent the
system overload during peak hours.
• orp is the objective used for maximising the reputation
of the Provider [12]. Reputation is an important issue,
because if a Provider violates a SLA it not only must pay
a penalty to the Client, but also will loss its reputation in
the Market. In consequence, future Clients will be reticent
to buy their resources.
Literature details revenue as the main objective in markets.
The other objectives where chosen as examples of suitable
goals in such a scenario according to the related work.
However, each provider must decide his own relevant goals.
This paper demonstrates how the behaviour of the Provider
can be modulated by changing the values of the compo-
nents of O that multiply their associated sub-utility functions
urv, ucc, uph, urp in negotiation time, as can be shown in the
utility function applied to the context of the chosen objectives
(Equation 2).
U(S) = orvurv + occucc + ophuph + orpurp (2)
The rest of this section describes and justifies the sub-utility
functions chosen in this paper, calculated in base to the SLA
S ⊆ {M,C,CP,Rev,Δt}, where M,C are the Memory and
CPUs amount to acquire, 0 ≤ CP ≤ 1 is the indicator of
Client Priority, Δt is the time slot where the resources are
assigned and Rev is the revenue acquired by the sale. All the
sub-utilities are normalised to the same range [−1, 1] because
otherwise the influence of the weights O would be distorted
by the differences between the ranges of the sub-utilities.
1) Price maximisation: Before describing urv , ucc, uph and
urp, it is advisable to describe an utility function that it is
not used as a term of U(S), but some of the other sub-utility
functions depend on it: the price maximisation utility function.
When the Provider proposes a price, it must know the range
of prices where the agreement is possible. The reservation
price of the seller (RPs) is the minimum price that the seller
can accept without losing money. The reservation price of the
buyer (RPb) is the maximum price it can pay and still being
beneficial for its objectives. An agreement between buyer and
seller is only possible when RPs ≤ Price ≤ RPb.
Equation 3 defines the utility for given revenue:
up(S) =
Price−RPs
RPb −RPs (3)
That means that the utility of the price for the Provider is
higher (∼ 1) when the revenue of the Provider tends to be
RPb. However, this sub-utility function is not used directly as
a term in U(S), because in a competitive Market high prices
will enforce Clients to look for cheaper Providers.
The main issue of implementing this formula is to know the
reservation price of the buyer, which only can be speculated
in function of the Market history.
2) Total revenue maximisation: For maximising the total
revenue, it is needed to have into account the price of the
sale, but also the status of the competitive Market. Having
into account the Law of Supply and Demand [4], it is needed
to define urv to propose different prices in function of the
Market status, so they will tend to be higher in demand excess
scenarios and lower in offer excess scenario.
To check the Market status, an aggressiveness factor a(t)
has been defined: it is intended to limit the profit expectations
of the provider. In scenarios where many clients ask for scarce
resources, providers are in an opportunistic situation for asking
prices that are near to the buyers’ reservation price. In this
case, a(t) → 1. In the opposite scenario (offer excess) the
providers must limit their economic pretensions, so a(t) → 0.
Let t be the current time, H be the length of an historic
time period, Ctot(t) be a constant function whose value is the
number of CPUs of the Provider, and Cused(t) be a function
that describes the number of busy CPUs in the Provider over
time. Equation 4 is the ideal aggressiveness factor a′(t).
a′(t) =
∫ t
t−H
Cused(t) dt∫ t
t−H
Ctot(t) dt
(4)
Let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 the aggressiveness adjustment rate which
shows how quick the actual aggressiveness will tend to the
ideal aggressiveness, Equation 5 shows how the aggressiveness
a(t) is adjusted in function of the ideal aggressiveness and the
previous actual aggressiveness:
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Figure 1. Firt attempts for defining urv(S)
a(t) = a′(t)δ + a(t− 1) (1− δ) (5)
Once a(t) are defined up(S), there is enough data to define
an urv(S) to achieve the next goals:
• In an offer excess scenario, where a(t) is low, Clients will
choose Providers that offer lower prices (up(S) → 0) for
the same SLA. So urv(S) → 1 when up(S) → 0.
• In a demand excess scenario, where a(t) is high, Clients
will have to accept high prices (up(S) → 1), since they
have very few alternatives. So it is convenient for the
Provider to push up its prices for maximising its benefit.
First intuition says that the Law of Supply and Demand can
be accomplished by adjusting linearly the prices in function of
the demand, as shown in the maximum values (darkest colour)
of Figure 1(a). The equation that describes this behaviour
is urv(S) = sin
(
π
2
(up(S) + (1− a(t)))
)
. However, the ex-
perimentation results shown that, even if a(t) is relatively
high, the Clients have chances to choose cheaper Providers,
so maximising urv(S) would lead to have less revenue.
Alternatively, one can divide a(t) in order to de-
crease the utility when prices are too high in high-
demand market scenarios. The new formula is urv(S) =
sin
(
π
2
(up(S) + (1− a(t)/div))
)
, where div denotes the
slope of the crest of the function maximums, as can be seen
in Figure 1(b). That function is effective in normal Market
status, but not in those where the demand excess is extremely
high (a(t)  1), because it does not take profit from the good
position of the Provider in the negotiation.
First attempt (Figure 1(a)) is precise when a(t) is low, but
not when a(t) is high. However, the results of second attempt
(Figure 1(b)) are opposite to the first one. To try to combine
both, instead of dividing a(t), in the third attempt a(t) has
been powered to curv (see Equation 6), that describes the
intensity of the curve of the crest of Figure 2. In this way,
the prices will be low in almost all the scenarios, excepting
in the very excess of demand, when a(t) → 1 and the prices
can be high. In addition, up(S) is multiplied by an attractor
called G that will make utilities lower when combinations
of (up(S), a(t)) are far from the crest of the function. That
will force even more providers to look for combinations
(up(S), a(t)) near to the maximum of the utility.
urv(S) = sin
(π
2
(G · up(S) + (1− a(t)cur))
)
(6)
Figure 2. Colour map that represents the value of urv(S) in function of
up(S) and a(t)
Since the range of utilities in Equation 6 is [−1, 1], the
whole equation is divided by 2 and added 0.5 to normalize
the range of utilities to [0 : 1]. The resulting formula is the
Equation 7.
urv(S) = 0.5 +
sin
(
π
2
(G · up(S) + (1− a(t)cur))
)
2
(7)
After several tests and experiments in competing market
simulations, the combinations of values for G and cur con-
stants that provide the best results are G = 2 and cur = 15,
which are used in the experiments performed in the paper.
The colour map in Figure 2 helps to understand better the
function in Equation 7. The dark zones show these combina-
tions of up(S) and a(t) that gives higher values for urv .
3) Client classification: Client classification is performed
through price discrimination [11]. The parameter CP is the
Client Priority, which tends to 1 when the Client is much
related to the organisation of the Provider, and tends to 0
when there is absolutely no relation between the Client and
the Provider. It is calculated as the Euclidean distance between
Client and Provider in a multi-dimensional space.
Equation 8 is used to define the utility for Client classifi-
cation. Given urv and CP , if the Client priority is high, the
utility will be higher when urv is low (the Provider must not
be expensive for related Clients). If the Client priority is low,
the utility will be higher when urv is high.
ucc(S) =
{
CP + up(S) if up < 1− CP
2− CP − up(S) otherwise (8)
4) Prioritisation of off-peak hours: Let Δt = tf − ti be
the interval of time where the task is executed, Ctot(t) be a
constant function whose value is the number of CPUs of the
Provider, C(t) be a constant function whose value the number
of CPUs requested to the task under negotiation, and Cused(t)
be a function that describes the number of busy CPUs in the
Provider over time. Equation 9 is the utility function that is
higher when more resources are free, and near 0 when the
Provider resources are near its maximum occupation.
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uph(S) = 1−
∫ tf
ti
Cused(t) + C(t) dt∫ tf
ti
Ctot(t) dt
(9)
In the experiments, both CPU and Memory are negotiated.
But since CPU is the bottleneck, it is used as the resource for
calculating the peak hours.
5) Utility for reputation: Let R0 be the reputation of the
Provider in negotiation time, Rv be the future reputation of the
Provider in case of SLA violation, Rf the future reputation
in case of correct SLA fulfilment, and P the probability of
violating an SLA (calculated from historical data); Equation
10 shows the utility of keeping the reputation of the Provider:
urp(S) =
P Rv + (1− P )Rf
R0
− 1 (10)
Rv and Rf are calculated as described in [12].
D. Maximising the utility function
When the Provider receives an offer, it must specify a price
and a range of time (if the requested time is not fixed) to
maximise the utility function.
Maximising nonlinear utility functions can be pretty com-
plex, especially when multiple variables exist. Choquet In-
tegrals [13] have been used for multi-criteria decision with
nonadditive functions where some of their values are fuzzy.
However, they do not help to maximise the function, but only
to choose the best alternative from a set.
The framework used in this paper uses discrete values
of time and price, and does not need fuzzy logic because
the data used in the utility functions is well known by the
Provider (excepting the Reservation Price of the Client, which
is speculated). Then U(S), which is theoretically continuum,
is divided into a finite set of values in function of discretised
price and time. Choosing the best price and time slot is
choosing the pair of price and time whose U(S) is greater
to the U(S) values for all the other pairs.
E. Why is the resource information needed?
When calculating up(S) for price maximisation, it is impor-
tant to know the status of the resources and how an incoming
SLA can affect into this status, in order to quantify them
economically and calculate the Reservation Price of the Seller.
up(S) and the a(t) have a decisive role when calculating the
utility for maximising the global revenue urv(S). Section III-C
shown how a(t) is calculated as a function of the historical
monitoring data from the resources. The same historical data
is also used to calculate uph(S), that gives more importance
to the jobs which are located in off-peak hours.
The resource information is also really important when
calculating urp(S), because the probability P of breaking an
incoming SLA is calculated in function to statistical monitor-
ing data of past executions and the current monitoring status.
Even an utility function such as ucc(S) used to perform
Client Classification, has relation with the resource informa-
tion, since it is calculated as a function of up(S).
IV. EVALUATION
A. Simulation environment
A simple Market has been simulated to test the validity
of the negotiation model. Client Brokers that represent either
a Web or Grid Client enters in the Market to ask for web
workload or for plain resources. The workload for Grid has
a random distribution and the workload for Web Services has
distribution taken from a real Web application, with variable
workload in function of the hour of the day [14].
Grid Clients send an SLA proposal where is specified the
plain resources (CPU and Memory) to buy, the duration of the
job, and a time interval where the job can be executed (bigger
than the duration, to let the EERM schedule the best execution
time). Web Service Clients send a required workload for a
service, and a fixed time interval to use the services (there is
no arbitrary schedule of the reservation, since Web users want
the services for the same moment).
Both Client types also must specify what QoS class they
want: Gold, Silver, or Bronze. Gold Clients will pay the triple
than Bronze Clients, and Silver Clients the double than Bronze
ones. The average failure rates for Gold, Silver, and Bronze
services are, respectively, 0.5%, 1%, and 2%.
A Client looks for potential Providers in the Market and
sends SLA Proposals to all of them. After that, the Providers
accept/deny the proposals and return to it a time allocation and
a price, based on the maximisation of their utility function.
Finally, the Client chooses the Provider with a best price and
time schedule for its interests and sends it a confirmation.
The Provider can violate the SLA due to an internal error,
or because it receives a proposal from another Client that can
not be allocated but is interesting to accept it and cancel
the other (it is decided by the utility function having into
account objectives such as Client classification or Revenue
maximisation) [9], [8]. This violation will affect to the rep-
utation of the Provider, which is taken into account by the
Client in negotiation time: when choosing the best SLA, the
price proposed by the Provider is divided by its reputation,
so the Client will consider the price of a Provider with low
reputation higher than the same price from a Provider with
high reputation.
B. Checking statistically the effectiveness of the sub-utility
functions
In this test, repeated simulations are performed in a com-
petitive Market with 100 Providers, whose different objective
weights for U(S) are generated randomly to provide some
statistically valuable data. Simulations are repeated with a
number of Clients that vary from 50 (offer excess) to 1000
(demand excess). Each Provider is selling 20 CPUs and 6GB
of RAM memory.
This section shows the results of the simulation in terms
of the four objectives described in Section III-C. For each
simulation, the next data is collected from the Provider side:
• Revenue: total revenue of the Provider.
• AvgPrice: average price of Resource/Hour sold.
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Figure 3. Correlation between orv and some output parameters
• AvgAffinity: average affinity of Clients that use the system
(value CP of section III-C3).
• AvgReputation: average reputation of the Provider during
the whole execution.
• AvgOfferPrice: the price of Resource/Hour that the
Provider offers to the Client. The difference with Avg-
Price is that it includes only the prices of the agreed
negotiations, and AvgOfferPrice includes the offer prices
for both the agreed and non-agreed negotiations.
To show the effectiveness of the utility functions proposed
in this paper, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [15]
between the collected data and the objectives orv , occ, oph and
orp is calculated.
1) Revenue maximisation: Figure 3 shows how orv has a
slightly influence in the total revenue of the Provider (around
0.2). Obviously the correlation coefficient cannot be 1 because
there are many other factors that have influence in the revenue.
However, there is a big negative linear relationship between
orv and the price that the Provider proposes for the sale of the
resource in negotiation time (AvgOfferPrice): Providers that
want to sell more must decrease their prices. However it can
be observed that orv has a positive influence on the prices of
the sold resources (AvgPrice). It is because the maximisation
of U(S) will lead to ask the optimum prices in function of
the Market status (speculated by a(t)).
In a extreme demand excess scenario (900-1000 Clients),
where the Provider can be more aggressive in its negotiations,
it can be observed a positive correlation between orv , AvgOf-
ferPrice and AvgPrice. However the correlation with the total
revenue is more or less the same. That does not mean that the
utility function is less efficient, it means that all the Providers
increase their revenues because the Market status, and the
influence of orv in the total revenue is less in percentage.
2) Client classification: Figure 4 shows the effectiveness
of the inclusion of occucc(S) in the general utility function:
the higher is occ, the higher is the affinity (around 0.6 in all
the Market scenarios).
As described in Section III-C3, ucc is strongly related with
up. Figure 4 reflects this relation as a negative correlation
between the occ, the global revenue, and the average price.
Since the Provider will try to sell to affine customers, it will
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Figure 4. Correlation between occ and some output parameters
Figure 5. Allocation in time of workloads divided by Web Services or Grid
offer them its resources at lower prices, and there are more
possibilities that Clients choose affine Providers.
3) Priorisation of off-peak hours: Web Services must be
executed in fixed intervals, and Grid jobs have a random
distribution, but since they are not real-time applications, they
can be scheduled to be executed in the future. Figure 5 shows
how the inclusion of ophuph(S) in U(S) allows the Providers
offering better prices to the Clients in off-peak hours and, in
consequence, the Grid jobs are automatically executed when
the Web Services workload is low.
4) Reputation: Figure 6 shows that, unlike we expected be-
fore running the simulations, orp does not have any influence
on the average reputation of the Provider. However, the results
are interesting because urp acts as a risk manager. The figure
show how the average price of the sold resources is increased
or decreased in function to the reputation. This means that the
Provider will charge a small amount of money to compensate
possible losses as consequence of the loss of reputation.
Previous work [12] shows clearly the importance of keeping
a high reputation. In the experiments, the revenue increases
almost linearly with the reputation. At equal prices, a Client
will choose the Provider with higher reputation. The alternative
to Providers with low reputation is to decrease their prices.
C. Comparison with fixed-pricing Providers
In this experiment, 10 different Providers have been com-
pared: four Providers that implement negotiation as proposed
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Figure 6. Correlation between orp and some output parameters
in this paper and six Providers that implement fixed pricing.
Each one of the Providers that use nonadditive utility functions
for negotiation has a main objective whose o weight value is
0.55 and the other secondary objectives have a weight of 0.15.
So there is a Provider that prioritises revenue maximisation,
other that prioritises Client classification, one that prioritises
off-peak hours, and other that prioritises reputation maximi-
sation. On the side of Providers with fixed pricing, since it
is difficult to know beforehand what is the best fixed price,
six Providers with different prices have been added into the
testbed. Each Provider proposes always a fixed percentage
between the RPS and the RPb, by having respectively fixed
values of α = {0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.10, 0.12, 0.14} in the next
pricing formula:
Price = RPs + α (RPb −RPs)
Since in a competing Market fixed-pricing Providers do not
have influence in the peak minimisation nor the reputation
maximisation decisions of their competitors, only Providers
that maximise revenue and perform the Client classification
have been compared with the fixed-pricing ones. Furthermore,
the influence of not implementing peaks minimisation in them
is shown. However, the influence of policies for reputation
maximisation cannot be shown because the data set in this
experiment is too small to establish correlations and the influ-
ence of orpurp(S) cannot be compared in terms of achieved
reputation with the other Providers.
1) Revenue maximisation: Figure 7 shows that adaptive
pricing by maximisation of nonadditive utility functions is the
best choice in almost all the scenarios. In the high excess of
offer scenarios (20 Clients), fixed-pricing Providers that sell
their resources at low price (Fix 4% and Fix 6%) have more
revenue than adaptive pricing Providers (RV). This is because
the biggest part of the demand is shared across Providers with
low prices, and since these Providers sell their resources at
higher prices than RV, they earn more money.
Also in the highest demand scenarios (8 to 10 Clients per
each Provider), the fixed-pricing Providers with highest prices
earn more money than the adaptive pricing one. In this case,
Clients do not have enough alternatives for choosing and they
Figure 7. Comparison of revenue between a Provider that tries to maximise
the revenue (RV) with fixed-pricing Providers
Figure 8. Comparison of Client affinity between a Provider that performs
Client classification (CC) with fixed-pricing Providers
must accept almost any offer. Providers with highest prices
can take advantage of this situation.
2) Client classification: Figure 8 shows in a graphical way
how efficient is Client classification compared to Providers
that do not perform it (the fixed-pricing ones).
It can be seen how average affinity of Clients decreases
when the Clients number increases. It is because the Provider
with Client classification can accept almost all the affine users
when its resources are idle, but when it is overloaded, most
of the Clients cannot use its resources and must look for less
affine ones. A way of keeping high affinity in all the scenarios
could be by implementing job cancellation for low-affinity
users. But this solution will entail other important problems,
such as economic losses due to the pay of penalties and the
loss of reputation.
3) Peak-hours minimisation: Figure 9 shows clearly the
influence of not having policies for the minimisation of off-
peak hours. Since the Providers that use nonadditive utility
functions maximisation can allocate the workloads in off-peak
hours at better prices, (as shown in figure 5), Providers that do
not implement peak minimisation policies do not execute Grid
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Figure 9. Sample distribution of workload types in a Provider without
peak-hours minimisation policies. It can be observed that there are no Grid
workloads
workloads. In the experiments performed, only the Provider
that offered the lowest fixed prices (4% over RPs) in demand
excess scenario executed 3 Grid jobs. The allocations for all
the other fixed-pricing Providers do not include any Grid job.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The first aim of this paper is to show the benefits of applying
knowledge about resources to Market negotiations. In Cloud
Computing Markets, this will lead to the Market Broker to
perform better business decisions. This paper demonstrated
how the figure of an EERM can benefit Providers by providing
resource data to the Brokers and by considering economic
policies in resource management.
The other contribution of this paper is the intention of
being a step forward in the modelling and evaluation of utility
functions for negotiations in Cloud Computing Markets. The
simulations show how a Provider can perform complex actions
by only maximising a multi-dimensional utility function. The
contribution of these experiments is based in the usage of
nonadditive utility functions, more difficult to treat, but needed
when assuming that the terms under negotiation are not
independent between them. In the model defined in Section
III-C, the utilities for Client classification ucc(S) and revenue
maximisation urv(S) were related by the price: maximising
the price would lead to maximise urv(S), but to minimise
ucc(S) for affine Clients.
The proposed nonadditive utility function considers the
possibility of having multiple objectives in a same entity, such
as revenue maximisation, Client classification, reputation or
load-balancing in time. In order to keep the efficiency both
in business and performance terms, most of the parameters
that compose the utility function are collected dynamically
from the resource-level information. This paper has shown
the high importance of having this information available in
negotiation time. The simulations performed demonstrate how
the objectives can be partially achieved by balancing correctly
their weights in the utility function.
This paper leaves some open lines for future research, such
as improving utility functions for more efficient negotiations
and extending their terms to include other economic or perfor-
mance goals, finding methods for the maximisation of complex
nonadditive utility functions that include fuzzy values for
nondeterministic data, and evaluating the validity of the model
in a real Cloud Computing Market, taking real data from the
resource fabrics and compare it with other existing models.
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